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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 16-4379 
______________ 
 
AMY WEBER, Individually,  
and as Parent, Natural Guardian 
and Next Friend on behalf of K.A., a Minor 
 
v. 
 
FRANCES A. MCGROGAN, Individually and as a STATE 
actor Judge for the Bergen County Family Court; PETER J. 
MELCHIONNE, individually and as a STATE actor Judge 
for the Bergen County Family Court; KENNETH J. 
SLOMIENSKI, individually and as a STATE actor Judge for 
the Bergen County Family Court; GARY N. WILCOX, 
individually and as a STATE actor Judge for the Bergen 
County Family Court; BONNIE J. MIZDOL, individually and 
as a STATE actor Judge for the Bergen County Family Court; 
PETER DOYNE, individually and as a STATE actor Judge 
for the Bergen County Family Court; MARCELLE NICOLE, 
individually and as a STATE actor Law Clerk for the Bergen 
County Family Court; GOVENOR CHRIS CHRISTIE, 
individually and as STATE actor Governor; SENTATOR 
ROBERT MENENDEZ, individually and as STATE actor 
Senator; SENATOR NICHOLAS SACCO, individually and 
as STATE actor Senator; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; 
BERGEN COUNTY FAMILY COURT OF THE 
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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY; ANTHONY 
D'URSO; JOAN GLAESER; BRETT BILLER; RICHARD 
COCO; KYONGOK KIM; JULIA DEBELLIS; NINA 
AGRAWAL; JEMOUR MADDUX; SARA 
MICHAELOWLSKI; PATRICIA SERMABIKIAN; 
FAMILIES FIRST; VICTORIA MADDEN; CHILDRENS 
AIDS AND FAMILY SERVICES; RACHEL POLAN; 
PATRICIA KRYGER; MARIA MAHTANI; CLAIRE 
ABEL; DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND 
PERMANENCY f/k/a DYFS; ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW JERSEY BOARD OF 
ETHICS; MONIQUE D'ERRICO, Esq.; MARY ZEC, Esq.; 
CARYN STALTER, Esq.; YLLINI TORRES; DOLORES 
COUNNEELY; RUTH BAZZANO; LOURDES NUNEZ; 
DANILLE GONZALEZ; LUIS PADIERNA; CYNTHIA 
MCWHITE; VICTORIA SUMMERS; JOAN TAKACS; 
MARTHA VAZQUEZ; MARIA GONZALEZ; NICOLLE 
MILLER; HAYDEE ZAMORA-DALTON; KELLY 
NESTOR; LUKE DRUMMOND; MARISOL NARANJO; 
JESSICA MULLIGAN; BERGEN COUNTY DIVISION OF 
FAMILY GUIDANCE; JUDITH LEGGET; RESSA 
VILLANI; DENNIS CHETEYAN; DR. DANIEL 
BROMBERG; DR. DONNA LOBIONDO; SAMSIRI 
SOSTRE; VIVIAN CHERN SHNADIMAN; ROBERT 
LATIMER; DR. HAROLD GOLDSTEIN; JACQUELINE 
KIM SZABO; MICHAEL LAMOLINO, Esq.; ROBYN 
VEASEY; ALL ABOUT ME LEARNING CENTER; 
MICHAEL CULVER; CONNIE CULVER; DOES #1 THRU 
33; AUDREY HEPBURN CHILDREN'S HOUSE; KEYSHA 
TYSON; KEITH J. YONOS, Real Party of Interest   
 
Amy Weber, 
  Appellant 
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______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-14-cv-07340) 
District Judge: Hon. Claire C. Cecchi 
______________ 
 
Argued June 5, 2019 
 
Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and MATEY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: September 12, 2019) 
 
Christopher T. Zirpoli, Esq. [ARGUED] 
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 Court Appointed Amicus Curiae on behalf of Appellant 
 
Gurbir S. Grewal 
Thomas P. Lihan, Esq. 
Michael R. Sarno, Esq.  [ARGUED] 
Office of the Attorney General 
Division of Law 
25 Market Street 
Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 
Trenton, New Jersey 08625 
 Attorneys for Appellees Frances A. McGrogan, 
 individually and as a STATE Judge for the Bergen 
 County Family Court 
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Daniel R. Esposito, Esq. 
Buckly Theroux Kline 
707 State Road 
Princeton, NJ 08540 
 Attorney for Appellees Audrey Hepburn Children’s 
 House, Brett Biller, Richard Coco, Anthony D’Urso, 
 Joan Glaeser, Kyongok Kim, Jemour Maddux, Sara 
 Michaelowlski, Patricia Sermabikian 
 
Robert E. Levy, Esq. 
Scarinci & Hollenbeck 
1100 Valley Brook Avenue 
P.O. Box 790 
Lyndhurst, NJ 07071 
 Attorney for Appellee Senator Robert Menendez, 
 individually and as State actor Senator  
 
Cyndee L. Allert, Esq. 
Elizabeth A. Farrell, Esq. 
Dughi Hewit & Domalewski 
340 North Avenue East  
Suite 2  
Cranford, NJ 07016 
 Attorneys for Appellees Julia DeBellis, Nina Agrawal, 
 Robert Latimer 
 
Paul J. Soderman, Esq. 
Suite 202 
157 Eagle Rock Avenue 
Roseland, NJ 07068 
 Attorney for Appellee Families First, Victoria Madden 
 
Darrell M. Felsenstein, Esq.  
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12 Route 17 North 
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 Services, Rachel Polan, Patricia Kryger, Maria 
 Mahtani, Claire Abel 
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56 Livingston Avenue 
Roseland, NJ 07068 
 Attorney for Dr. Daniel Bromberg, Dr. Donna 
 LoBiondo 
 
William J. Buckley, Esq. 
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 Attorneys for Vivian Chern Shnadiman 
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Marks O’Neill O’Brien Doherty & Kelly 
535 Route 38 East 
Suite 501 
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 
 Attorney for Jacqueline Kim Szabo 
 
 
MATEY, Circuit Judge. 
Sometimes a difficult journey produces fresh insights, 
like when the “[l]ongest way round is the shortest way home.”1 
In this appeal, Amy Weber argues persuasively that her 
complaint was erroneously dismissed. But rather than decide 
that question, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of a final 
order. That result is regrettable, but not unexpected, as finality 
is a necessary predicate to appellate review. Indeed, an epic 
poem of problems often follows when charting any other 
course. Our opinion seeks to eliminate some of that confusion 
while reminding litigants and courts that following the rules 
ensures predictable outcomes and effective results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
1 JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 309 (Gabler ed., Random 
House, Inc. 1986) (1922). 
____________ 
 
OPINION
____________
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I. The Proceedings Before the District Court 
 
A. Weber Begins Her Odyssey 
 
We begin our journey in 2014 when Appellant Amy 
Weber sued, pro se, nearly sixty defendants in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey.2 Weber’s 
complaint stems largely from her experiences dealing with 
New Jersey public officials during a child custody matter, a 
controversy that involved litigation in the New Jersey state 
courts. When she filed her federal complaint, Weber was also 
appealing an adverse custody decision to the Appellate 
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. The specter of this 
seemingly related state court action caused the District Court 
to consider the prudential limitations on subject-matter 
jurisdiction in the abstention doctrines. Following briefing, the 
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that 
Weber’s claims be dismissed under the principles of Rooker-
Feldman or Younger.3 And that is where the story begins its 
journey into mystery.  
 
 
                                              
2 We thank the court-appointed amicus curiae appearing 
on behalf of the appellant for his able assistance.  
 
3 Both doctrines are narrow prudential exceptions to 
federal jurisdiction. Rooker-Feldman instructs courts to refrain 
from matters inviting direct review of state-court judgments. 
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 
280, 284 (2005). Younger abstention seeks to avoid 
interference with ongoing state proceedings. See Sprint 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77–78 (2013). 
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B. Between Scylla and Charybdis 
 
The District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion 
adopting the Report and Recommendation, accompanied by an 
order dismissing Weber’s complaint without prejudice and 
permitting her thirty days to amend. In a letter dated June 27, 
2016, Weber filed a notice of appeal with this Court. That 
notice prompted a July 21, 2016 letter by our Circuit Clerk 
advising Weber that her appeal “will be submitted to a panel of 
this Court for possible dismissal due to a jurisdictional defect” 
because her complaint had been dismissed by the District Court 
without prejudice and thus “may not be reviewable at this time 
by a court of appeals.” The Clerk’s letter enclosed a copy of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and summarized the holding in Borelli v. City of 
Reading, 532 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam), stating that, 
“to be final, order of dismissal must be with prejudice; order 
dismissing without prejudice contemplates leave to amend and 
is not appealable unless plaintiff elects to stand on 
complaint . . . .” Multiple defendants echoed the same 
jurisdictional concern in contemporaneous letters to this Court.  
 
 In response, Weber wrote to the District Court advising 
that she had “taken [her] case into appeal” and “kindly 
requesting for your final court order regarding my case . . . to 
allow me to proceed accordingly.” Receiving no response, 
Weber wrote to this Court and asked to withdraw her appeal. 
The Clerk of the Court advised Weber in a new letter that if she 
wished to withdraw her appeal, she must file a motion or the 
case would move forward. 
 
 And so Weber moved to dismiss her appeal to prevent, 
she wrote, “more ‘jurisdictional defects.’” This Court granted 
her motion.  
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C. Flight from the Cave of Polyphemus 
 
 With Weber’s appeal dismissed, some defendants began 
to wonder where the case now stood. So, on November 29, 
2016, counsel for a few wrote the District Court that Weber’s 
thirty-day period to amend her complaint following the June 9 
dismissal without prejudice “has long passed” and that 
defendants “seek dismissal with prejudice.”4 The next day, the 
District Court made an electronic entry on the docket that 
stated: “Civil Case Terminated. (Clerk’s Note: Please see 
Order Dkt. Entry #119) (sr, ) (Entered: 11/30/2016)[.]”5 
Believing herself free from the jurisdictional defects of her 
earlier appeal, Weber filed a new notice of appeal on December 
15, 2016. That appeal is before us today and turns on a 
surprisingly elusive question: is there a final order of the 
District Court dismissing Weber’s complaint? 
 
II. There Is No Appellate Jurisdiction  
Absent A Final Order 
 
A. The Statutory Framework 
 
 As with every case, we begin by assessing our 
jurisdiction. Congress has given the federal circuit courts 
                                              
4 The letter referenced a phone call stating “[m]y office 
contacted Your Honor’s chambers and was advised that Your 
Honor would not require a formal motion.” Counsel 
accompanied a draft order of dismissal with prejudice for the 
District Court’s convenience.  
 
5 Docket entry “#119” referred to the June 9 order that 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice. 
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jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district 
courts[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A “final decision” is “one which 
ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court 
to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 
U.S. 229, 233 (1945). The requirement of finality is often 
described as serving “the important purpose of promoting 
efficient judicial administration.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). A final decision or 
judgment is “[a] court’s last action that settles the rights of the 
parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except for . . . 
enforcement of the judgment.” Final Judgment, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). That may well mean a party must 
delay appellate review; indeed, “the possibility that a ruling 
may be erroneous and may impose additional litigation 
expense is not sufficient to set aside the finality requirement 
imposed by Congress.” Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 
U.S. 424, 436 (1985). The benefits of certainty are superior to 
the costs, and courts “routinely require litigants to wait until 
after final judgment to vindicate valuable rights, including 
rights central to our adversarial system.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. 
v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108–09 (2009). Both the command 
of Congress and the guidance of the Supreme Court direct “a 
healthy respect for the virtues of the final-judgment rule.” Id. 
at 106. 
 
B. Weber’s Arguments 
 
 Recall that while Weber filed two separate notices of 
appeal, only the second is before us now. So, we must consider 
what, if any, final order supports that appeal. Weber offers two 
possibilities: first, the November docket entry “terminating” 
her case, and second, the June order of dismissal without 
prejudice. We consider each, finding the first ends up running 
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aground on the text of the Federal Rules, while the second asks 
us to stray too far from the route prescribed by Congress.   
 
1. Utility Events Are Not Orders 
 
 Weber first argues the District Court’s November 30, 
2016 docket entry constituted a final appealable order, making 
her second notice of appeal timely. Our opinion in Witasick v. 
Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., reasons otherwise. 803 
F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2015). In Witasick, we explained the 
differences between the three distinct types of case-related 
electronic entries on a federal case docket: text orders, utility 
events, and minute entries.6 Each has a distinct purpose. First, 
a text order “as its name suggests, is an order of the court, with 
specific text granting, denying, or otherwise resolving a motion 
or, ultimately, a case” including, among other purposes, “to set 
a hearing, order briefing” and “to rule on substantive motions 
. . . .” Witasick, 803 F.3d at 189. Text orders are most 
significant because they “contain an electronic signature of a 
judge.” Id. By contrast, a “‘utility event’ is an entry which 
records an event or action in the life of a case.” Id. And mere 
“minute entries reflect time spent in court[,]” including a case 
management conference or contempt hearing. Id. 
  
 Weber tries to distinguish Witasick because the 
November 30 docket entry includes the note “(Clerk’s Note: 
                                              
6 The “docket” is “[a] formal record in which a judge or 
court clerk briefly notes all the proceedings and filings in a 
court case.” Docket, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 
 
 12 
 
Please see Order Dkt. Entry #119),” a reference to the June 9 
order of dismissal without prejudice. That reference, Weber 
reasons, eliminates any doubt about the entry’s meaning. 
Perhaps, but it’s not a final order. Replacing the clarity of a 
signed, labeled order with inferences drawn from other entries 
is the very danger we sought to avoid in Witasick.7 These 
distinctions matter because as we noted in Witasick, “utility 
events . . . are not orders of the district court nor are they signed 
by a judge. As such, they cannot serve as a foundation for an 
appeal.” Id. at 189. The November 30 docket entry is a utility 
event, and Weber cannot rely on the entry.  
 
2. “Standing on the Complaint” 
 
 Weber also argues that the notice filed in December was 
a timely appeal from the District Court’s June 9 order 
dismissing her complaint without prejudice. The problem with 
that theory seems obvious: a dismissal without prejudice and 
with leave to amend isn’t a final order. But it turns out things 
are somewhat murky because courts have found opportunities 
to stray from the plain meaning of finality. From time to time, 
and usually citing noble goals, circuit courts have side-stepped 
the finality requirement of § 1291, relying on the oft-quoted 
                                              
7 A comparison with the June 9, 2016 electronic entry 
corresponding to the order dismissing Weber’s complaint 
without prejudice highlights the difference. That entry reads: 
“ORDER dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint w/out prejudice, 
and Plaintiff shall have 30 days in which to file an Amended 
Complaint that cures the deficiencies set forth by the Court in 
its corresponding Opinion. Signed by Judge Claire C. Cecchi 
on 6/9/16. (sr, ) Modified on 6/13/2016 (jl). (Entered: 
06/10/2016).” (D.C. ECF No. 119.)  
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preference for a “practical rather than a technical construction” 
of the law. Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 261 (3d Cir. 
2005) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). And so, exceptions sprouted like 
dandelions, including “practical finality,” “effectively out of 
court,” “pragmatic finality,” “marginal finality,” and even the 
“death-knell” doctrine. See 19 Moore’s Federal Practice, §§ 
201.11, 202.08–10 (Matthew Bender 3d Ed.). Not surprisingly, 
“[t]he law of federal appellate jurisdiction is widely regarded 
as a mess.” Bryan Lammon, Finality, Appealability, and the 
Scope of Interlocutory Review, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1809, 1810 
(2018).  
 
 Seizing on this opening, Weber explains that the June 9 
order dismissing her complaint without prejudice could not 
become final until the expiration of the thirty-day period for 
her to amend. So, she argues, the June 9 order “matured into a 
final decision” on July 9, 2016. (Amicus Br. at 21.) And her 
argument isn’t novel, because our circuit has created the “stand 
on the complaint” doctrine, to find or foreclose appellate 
jurisdiction in cases involving a complaint dismissed without 
prejudice and without a final order from the district court. Such 
dismissals should, under § 1291, fail the finality requirement. 
The “stand on the complaint” doctrine, and its offspring, hold 
otherwise. Which brings us to Borelli v. City of Reading, the 
case cited in the Circuit Clerk’s July 26, 2016 letter.  
 
 Borelli involved a dispute over a redevelopment project. 
Both sides moved for summary judgment. Borelli, 532 F.2d at 
951. Based on the defendants’ motion, the district court 
determined that the plaintiff lacked standing. Id. The court thus 
dismissed the complaint without prejudice, and the plaintiff 
appealed. Id. In a short per curiam opinion dismissing the 
 14 
 
matter for lack of jurisdiction, we recited the basic rule that “an 
order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither 
final nor appealable because the deficiency may be corrected 
by the plaintiff without affecting the cause of action.” Id. But 
then, we added the comment that “[o]nly if the plaintiff cannot 
amend or declares his intention to stand on his complaint does 
the order become final and appealable.” Id. at 951–52 
(emphasis added). Borelli explained that when a plaintiff 
prefers not to amend, he “may file an appropriate notice with 
the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, 
at which time an order to dismiss the action would be 
appropriate.” Id. at 951 n.1. That statement is not remarkable; 
a plaintiff is always free to decline an invitation to amend a 
seemingly defective complaint and, instead, seek a final 
appealable order.8 
 
 Nothing in Borelli suggests an exception to the statutory 
requirement of finality, nor, of course, would such a re-writing 
of a statute be possible. Yet, in time, our decisions have 
dropped the important second step of Borelli—seeking and 
                                              
8 The phrase “stand on the complaint” traces to at least 
the early twentieth century where the Supreme Court, while 
summarizing the procedural posture of a case, noted instances 
when a plaintiff decided to “stand on the complaint” rather than 
amend. See, e.g., United States v. John Barth Co., 279 U.S. 
370, 373 (1929); Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 
U.S. 107, 114 (1912); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Slaght, 205 U.S. 122, 
129 (1907); Bockfinger v. Foster, 190 U.S. 116, 119 (1903); 
Filhiol v. Maurice, 185 U.S. 108, 108 (1902); Union 
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U.S. 149, 151 (1900). 
But those cases came with a final order of dismissal.  
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receiving a final order—and instead allowed the mere intent to 
forego further amendment to satisfy finality. See Berke v. 
Bloch, 242 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 2001). As might be expected 
from such a protean appellate standard, basic questions on the 
contours of this doctrine are elusive, leading us to concede that 
“[w]e cannot discern from our prior cases a clear rule for 
determining when a party has elected to stand on his or her 
complaint.” Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 
2009). As Weber seeks to rely on, and even expand this 
theory,9 we organize our existing rules and decisions before 
reaching her arguments.   
 
a. Intent-Based Exceptions Replacing Final Orders 
 
 Our decision in Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., began the 
loosening of the final order rule that Borelli had reinforced. 964 
F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1992). In Shapiro, the district court invited 
the plaintiffs to amend their complaint, warning that if nothing 
arrived in thirty days the court would consider dismissal. Id. at 
278. The plaintiffs advised the district court they would not 
amend, but the court never entered a final order. Id. So, citing 
Borelli, the defendants “contend[ed] that this was not enough. 
They maintain[ed] that [the Court] lack[ed] jurisdiction 
because plaintiffs failed to obtain an explicit dismissal with 
prejudice.” Id. We disagreed, reasoning “[i]t seems clear that 
the district court planned to dismiss with prejudice any claims 
not amended. Requiring plaintiffs to return to the district court 
now would be a wasteful elevation of form over substance.” Id. 
Shapiro thus jettisoned the second prong of Borelli and can be 
                                              
9 While Weber does not invoke the doctrine by name, 
she still advocates for use of its underlying principle—for us to 
find appellate jurisdiction from a non-final order. 
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read as collapsing the jurisdictional inquiry into a single 
question: whether a plaintiff has “formally” stood on the 
complaint. Id. 
 
 Shortly after, the test relaxed again in Batoff v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848 (3d Cir. 1992). There, the district 
court dismissed the complaint and allowed thirty days to 
amend. Id. at 851 n.5. The plaintiff not only declined to amend 
but declined to file anything with the district court. Id. Rather, 
the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal before the thirty days 
elapsed. Id. We concluded that was enough under Borelli and 
Shapiro, finding that “by failing to move to amend within the 
30 days granted by the court, [the plaintiff] elected to stand on 
his complaint.” Id.  
 
 Shapiro and Batoff do not rest easily alongside Borelli’s 
simple statement that a clear and unequivocal declaration of 
intent to skip amendment and seek an order of dismissal satisfy 
§ 1291. Our decision in In re Westinghouse Securities 
Litigation, 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996), eases some of that 
tension. There, following a dismissal without prejudice, the 
plaintiffs filed a “Notice of Intention to Stand on Second 
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint,” explaining 
that after “carefully weigh[ing] the merits of repleading against 
seeking immediate appellate review” they “respectfully give 
notice of their intention to stand on the Complaint.” Id. at 703. 
Synthesizing Borelli and Shapiro, we held that “when plaintiffs 
elected to stand on the second amended complaint rather than 
replead . . . the remaining claims were dismissed with 
prejudice, and the case was closed in the district court[,]” 
leaving “no doubt that the district court’s dismissal of the case 
with prejudice was a reviewable, final order.” Id. at 705.  
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 Lack of doubt, therefore, emerges as the key to finding 
finality through the “stand on the complaint” doctrine. 
Equating finality with clear intent also grounds our decisions 
inferring a plaintiff’s decision to “stand on the complaint” 
based on inaction after entry of a self-executing order. For 
example, in Berke v. Bloch, the district court “closed” the case 
on the docket, but dismissed “without prejudice to the right, 
upon good cause shown, within 60 days, to reopen the action” 
if the parties could not reach a settlement agreement. 242 F.3d 
at 134–36. When the plaintiffs filed an appeal more than thirty 
days after the sixty-day period to reopen the case had run, we 
found the appeal untimely because plaintiffs’ failure to act is 
“akin to standing on the[] complaint.” Id. at 135. Berke 
reasoned that a non-final dismissal becomes final when it 
provides clear instructions that the order will “ripen[]” into a 
final order on the defined date if a plaintiff takes no action in 
response. Id. at 135.  
 
 With these decisions as our guide, two principles 
relevant to Weber’s appeal emerge. First, as in Berke, a “self-
effectuating” order is one that directs a party to take some 
action to cure a defective complaint by a defined date and 
provides express notice that it will then automatically produce 
a final order of dismissal when the time to amend runs out. 
Second, as in Westinghouse, a clear and unequivocal intent to 
decline amendment and immediately appeal that leaves no 
doubt or ambiguity can allow us to exercise jurisdiction. 
Following these decisions as we must, we apply each to 
Weber’s actions and conclude that we do not have appellate 
jurisdiction. 
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b.  The Stand on the Complaint Doctrine  
Does Not Aid Weber’s Appeal 
 
 Unlike our prior cases, Weber’s actions in the District 
Court leave ample room for doubt. In contrast to Berke, the 
District Court’s June 9 dismissal without prejudice was not 
“self-executing”; while it provided thirty days’ leave to file an 
amended complaint, it lacked any language converting the 
dismissal to a final order at the end of the period. And unlike 
Westinghouse, Weber did not submit a clear and unequivocal 
declaration of intent to “stand on her complaint.” True, when 
warned by the Circuit Clerk that her appeal could be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction, she appropriately notified the District 
Court of her plan to “take[] [her] case into appeal” and sought 
a final order. Had the District Court issued an order at that time, 
the judgment would be final under § 1291 and we would have 
jurisdiction over the appeal. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 
90 F.3d at 703–05. Instead, when Weber received no response, 
she moved to withdraw her appeal, perhaps fearing dismissal 
on jurisdictional grounds as the Circuit Clerk warned. 
Appellees were similarly concerned about the status of the 
action, as they too sought a final order from the District Court. 
Perhaps our own case law on the final order requirement of 
§ 1291 abetted this ambiguity and the parties’ confusion. But 
whatever our role, we remain bound by § 1291 not to accept 
jurisdiction absent a final order under these circumstances. 
Weber’s indecision does not show clear and unequivocal 
intent, and the “stand on the complaint” doctrine cannot rescue 
the lack of a final order given her ambiguous actions.10 
                                              
10 This conclusion fits with the approach taken by some 
circuits. In WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, the Ninth Circuit 
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 Even more to the point, our consideration of the “stand 
on the complaint” doctrine highlights the difficulty of basing 
appellate jurisdiction on deeds rather than words. We caution 
against traveling this circuitous route mindful that unless 
properly constrained, the “stand on the complaint” doctrine 
will continue to lure courts away from § 1291. It is, and always 
was, a narrow doctrine demanding sparing use under our duty 
to comply with the congressional grant of jurisdiction and the 
federal rules of procedure.11 Indeed, the only practice that 
                                              
reviewed an appeal from a dismissal without prejudice with 
thirty days’ leave to amend. 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 
banc). The plaintiff “did not amend, did not tell the district 
court that it would not do so, and did not obtain a final order of 
dismissal. It simply appealed.” Id. at 1134. The court dismissed 
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, explaining “[w]e now 
specifically rule that a plaintiff, who has been given leave to 
amend, may not file a notice of appeal simply because he does 
not choose to file an amended complaint. A further district 
court determination must be obtained.” Id. at 1136; see also 
Sapp v. City of Brooklyn Park, 825 F.3d 931, 934 (8th Cir. 
2016) (“[A] plaintiff may not appeal the dismissal of a 
complaint when the district court grants the plaintiff leave to 
amend his pleading.”) (internal quotations omitted); 
CompuServe Inc. v. Saperstein, 172 F.3d 47 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(unpublished table decision) (citing Borelli and observing, 
“[t]he law is clear when the district court expressly grants the 
dismissed party leave to amend. In such situations the 
dismissal is not final, and that order may not be appealed.”).  
 
11 Take a party seeking to dismiss a claim pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply 
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avoids these perils comes from the guidance offered in Borelli 
more than four decades ago: 
 
Since it may be difficult to determine whether the 
district court thought an amendment was 
possible and whether the plaintiff is willing or 
able to amend, we suggest that district judges 
expressly state, where appropriate, that the 
plaintiff has leave to amend within a specified 
period of time, and that application for dismissal 
of the action may be made if a timely amendment 
is not forthcoming within that time. If the 
plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an 
appropriate notice with the district court 
asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at 
which time an order to dismiss the action would 
be appropriate. 
                                              
with a court order. That is precisely the remedy sought by 
defendants here in their November 29, 2016 correspondence to 
the District Court. We have specified a rigorous six factor test 
to determine whether to dismiss a case under Rule 41(b). See 
Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cty., 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 
2019). Indeed, in Hildebrand, we vacated the dismissal of a 
suit after the docket idled for three years. Id. at 138. And the 
District Court here would have needed to perform the same 
analysis had Weber objected to a motion to dismiss with 
prejudice. We use a similar multi-factor test to determine 
whether we have jurisdiction from an appeal under the 
collateral order doctrine. See Gillette v. Prosper, 858 F.3d 833, 
839 (3d Cir. 2017). It is hard to reconcile our vigilant scrutiny 
of final orders in these areas with our tolerance for non-final 
dismissals. 
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Borelli, 532 F.2d at 951 n1. We reiterate that admonition today.
   
3.  There Is No Separate Document Triggering  
the Time to Appeal 
 
 Weber’s desire to use the June 9 order, and the thirty 
days for amendment that followed, encounters a separate 
problem under the Federal Rules. Some background on the 
calculation of the time to appeal is helpful. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 79 requires docket entries for certain actions 
including orders, verdicts, and judgments. Rule 58(b) requires 
prompt entry of each because they start the clock for the filing 
of an appeal. And Rule 58(a) requires a separate document for 
final judgments. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(a)(1)(A) then sets out the time to appeal a civil matter, 
generally thirty days after entry of the judgment or order. So, 
what happens when, as here, there is no separate document? 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(c)(2)(B) steps in to enter 
judgment—and begin the time to appeal—when 150 days have 
run from the docket entry. Civil Rule 58 and Appellate Rule 4 
“are designed to work in conjunction . . . to ensure that appeal 
time does not linger on indefinitely.” FED. R. CIV. P. 58 
advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment. 
 
 Recall Weber’s argument that the June 9 order “matured 
into a final decision” one month later. (Amicus Br. at 21.) But 
as we already know, the District Court entered nothing on the 
docket on that date. Lacking the required separate document 
under 58(c)(2), she turns to Rule 58(c)(2)(B) to give her 
another 150 days, which, combined with the thirty days to file 
her appeal, makes her December 15 notice timely. This 
argument, however, invites us to add pages to procedural 
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treatises by introducing a new doctrinal exception. We 
conclude instead that the plain text of Rule 58 controls.  
 
 Judgment arises under Rule 58(c)(2)(B) when “150 
days have run from the entry in the civil docket.” FED. R. CIV. 
P. 58(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Simply put, the predicate 
action thus required to begin the 150-day clock is an entry in 
the civil docket. Even if the June 9 order could qualify, that 
leaves Weber’s appeal a few days late under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a). Adding the extra thirty-day 
amendment period would do the trick, but to allow Weber this 
concession we would need to read the words “entry in the civil 
docket” out of Rule 58. Doing so would ignore the text of the 
rule and, soon enough, add fresh frustration to litigants and 
courts. As there was no final order on July 9, and thus no 
docket entry either, Rule 58 brings us no closer to the port of 
jurisdiction. 
 
III.  Weber’s Case Remains Pending in the District Court 
 
At long last, Weber finishes her odyssey like the fabled 
hero: back where she began. She has a live action still pending 
before the District Court. Sadly, all of this was avoidable 
proving that “[t]he undesirability of useless delays in litigation 
is more than offset by the hazards of confusion or 
misunderstanding as to the time for appeal.” Jung v. K. & D. 
Mining Co., 356 U.S. 335, 337 (1958). Our conclusion today 
means that Weber can still appeal her case by filing a notice of 
appeal after the District Court enters a final order. While both 
parties invite us to tuck Weber’s case into one of our self-
created doctrines or slip it into a new, narrow exception, we 
decline to depart from the requirements of the rules and the 
statutes, confident that any efficiency gained today will drown 
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in a sea of ambiguity tomorrow. The need for restraint in 
expanding exceptions to the rule of finality “has acquired 
special force . . . with the enactment of legislation designating 
rulemaking, ‘not expansion by court decision,’ as the preferred 
means for determining [appealability].”12 Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 
113 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 48 
(1995)). Such an allowance by Congress “warrant[s] the 
Judiciary’s full respect,” Id. at 114 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 
48), and we “resist[] efforts to stretch § 1291 to permit appeals 
of right that would erode the finality principle and disserve its 
objectives.” Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 1702, 1712 
(2017). Frustrating as it may be, Weber’s appeal is simply 
premature. 
 
Weber brings her appeal from a non-final order of the 
District Court. Because we are without jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, we cannot consider other independent bases 
raised by Appellees to affirm the District Court’s dismissal. 
And though we harbor doubts about the District Court’s 
dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman and Younger abstention 
doctrines, this too we cannot consider. We will therefore 
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.13  
                                              
12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c), the Supreme Court 
possesses the delegated authority to prescribe rules of 
procedure, including “rules that may define when a ruling of a 
district court is final for the purposes of appeal under section 
1291 of this title.”  
 
13 None of this is to imply that Weber’s case has merit. 
That determination awaits another day. 
